Incentivizing Nonproliferation: Theory, Policy, and Experience
One of the most significant inducements for nonproliferation compliance is the offer of sanctions relief. The chapter presents a typology of the multiple options available for easing or lifting sanctions pressure, giving policy makers a variety of means for encouraging nonproliferation compliance. These dynamics are illustrated in brief case analyses of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, attempts to constrain the nuclear program of North Korea, and Libya’s decision to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction.
Abstract
The chapter in the book, Sanctions for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Moving Forward, argues for a strategy that supplements the application of international sanctions by employing the full range of positive inducements and incentives associated with economic statecraft to persuade states to desist from or reverse policies of developing nuclear weapons.
A comparative analysis of sanctions and incentives indicates the value of integrating negative and positive measures to achieve desired policy objectives. Studies of the reasons why states comply with nonproliferation norms identify the following factors: security guarantees, assurances of mutual constraint that result from broad international compliance with the global nonproliferation regime, and the presence within states of domestic constituencies that seek to benefit from more open societies and global economic engagement.
David Cortright presented on this theme at the Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies weekly seminar on March 28 this year.