Abstract

We study influence competition between two players: a designer who can shape the pattern of interaction between a set of agents and influence them, and an adversary who can counterinfluence these agents. Creating the network and influencing agents are both costly activities for the two players. The final opinion and the vote of the agents depend on how the two players influence them as well as the opinion of their neighbors. Agent votes determine the payoffs of the two players and to win the designer must obtain the vote of all the agents. We begin by assuming that the designer has the better influence technology, and subsequently relax this assumption. We find that optimal strategies depend on the different costs incurred by the players, as well as who has the advantage in influence technology. We also study what happens when links between agents can arise randomly with a known exogenous probability, taking away some of the designer’s control over the network. We provide conditions under which the results of the benchmark model are preserved. Next, we modify two additional assumptions: (1) requiring the designer to only secure a majority of the votes, and (2) allowing the agents interact for several rounds before casting the final vote. In both cases, the designer needs fewer resources to win the game.

About the Authors

Christophe Bravard is a professor at Université Grenoble Alpes, specializing in economic theory. His research focuses on the existence and characterization of equilibrium networks, particularly within network formation games in industrial organizations and public economics. He teaches courses in Microeconomics, Game Theory, and Industrial Organization.

Jacques Durieu is a professor of economics at Université Grenoble Alpes, specializing in game theory and economic theory. His research includes adaptive learning, spatial games, and network formation.

Sudipta Sarangi (pictured) is a professor and department head at Virginia Tech. His research spans experimental and behavioral economics, network theory, and development economics. He has published extensively in leading academic journals and authored several books and is recognized for his contributions to understanding economic behavior and network formation.

Corinne Touati is a researcher at Inria specializing in strategic decision-making and its implications in networks. Her research intersects mathematics, computer science, and economics, focusing on areas like attack and defense strategies in networks, influence mechanisms in social networks, non-cooperative decision paradoxes, and fair resource sharing in networks.

Publication Details

Year: 2024